Z. J. v. Kansas City Brd of Police Comm

In Z.J., a Minor, by and through Her Next Friend, Je’tuan Jones v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, through its members: Alvin Brooks, Michael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric Enderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; and Venasa Ray, in Their Individual and Official Capacities, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019), the Eighth Circuit reviewed a Kansas City search-warrant operation that injured no one physically but allegedly caused serious psychological trauma to a two-year-old child.

Kansas City homicide detectives were investigating a murder. The victim’s cell phone was missing, and phone records led detectives to believe that a suspect, Lee Charles, was connected to a residence on Bristol Avenue. The investigation also produced information that the phone had been heard ringing near nearby Winchester Avenue apartments, but that fact was not included in the search-warrant affidavit. Detectives obtained a warrant for the Bristol residence, believing it was Charles’s home, and the warrant authorized a search for cell phones and other evidence.

Before the warrant was executed, Charles was arrested at another location. Detectives then contacted the tactical team to execute the warrant at the Bristol residence. At the tactical briefing, the SWAT team was told that Charles was already in custody. Officers did a drive-by to confirm the address, but the record indicated no further surveillance was conducted to determine who was inside the home.

The warrant was not a no-knock warrant. The SWAT team approached the front door in tactical gear with weapons drawn, knocked, and announced, “Police, search warrant!” The front entrance had an inner wooden door and an outer metal screen door, both requiring keys. A young woman inside, Carla Brown, opened the inner door. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, she held up and jingled her keys to show she was going to unlock the screen door. Before she opened it, officers breached the screen door and threw a flash-bang grenade into the living room.

The flash-bang grenade ignited the living-room drapes. Inside the home were three women, two of them elderly, and Z.J., a two-year-old girl. Officers found Z.J. in the living room, and one officer acknowledged she was very shaken. The suspect, Charles, did not live there anymore and reportedly had been kicked out months earlier. Z.J. later suffered developmental regression and was diagnosed with PTSD.

Z.J., through her next friend, sued the SWAT officers, the detectives, and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the SWAT team used excessive force by deploying the flash-bang grenade, that the detectives omitted material information from the warrant application and improperly used a SWAT team, and that the Board had unconstitutional policies or customs related to flash-bang use.

The main issue was whether officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using a flash-bang grenade during a residential search when the suspected violent offender was already in custody, officers had no specific information that anyone dangerous remained inside, and they had not determined whether innocent occupants were present.

The court also had to decide whether the detectives could be held liable for leaving out the fact that the victim’s phone had been heard ringing near the Winchester apartments rather than at the Bristol residence, and whether the detectives could be liable for deciding to use a SWAT team to execute the warrant.

Finally, the court considered whether it had jurisdiction at this stage of the case to review the Board’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment. In plain English, the court was sorting out who had to keep defending the case: the SWAT officers, the detectives, and/or the Board.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the SWAT team officers. The court held that, under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, using the flash-bang grenade was objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that flash-bang grenades can be useful in dangerous entries, but they also carry serious risks, including burns, fires, concussive force, trauma, and even death in some circumstances.

The practical rule from the court is that officers need an actual, articulable justification for deploying a flash-bang grenade. It is not enough to say that someone dangerous might theoretically be inside. Here, the SWAT team knew the homicide suspect was already in custody. They had no specific information that accomplices or armed persons were inside. They did not meaningfully determine whether innocent people, children, or elderly occupants were present. The court described a “flash-bang first, ask questions later” approach as inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.

The court also rejected the argument that the team was justified because it was “compromised” after the occupants knew police were there. The warrant required knock-and-announce, and the officers did announce their presence. The court reasoned that officers cannot rely on the loss of surprise caused by their own required knock-and-announce as a reason to blindly throw a flash-bang into a home, at least where they have no basis to believe the occupants are dangerous.

The court further held that the law was clearly established by 2010 under these circumstances. The Eighth Circuit concluded that any reasonable officer would have known that blindly deploying a flash-bang grenade into a residence was unconstitutional when officers had no basis to expect violence and had not reasonably checked for innocent bystanders. Because of that, the SWAT officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment.

The detectives received a different result. On the warrant-affidavit issue, the court held that the omitted information about hearing the victim’s phone near the Winchester apartments did not defeat probable cause. Even with that fact added, the affidavit still connected Charles to the victim’s phone and to the Bristol residence through multiple pieces of information. Therefore, the detectives were entitled to summary judgment on the claim that the warrant was invalid because of the omission.

On the decision to use the SWAT team, the court did not decide whether the detectives’ decision violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that even if the decision was unreasonable, it did not violate clearly established law under the facts of this case. The detectives knew a flash-bang might be possible, but the record did not show they directed or planned its use. The warrant was not a no-knock warrant, so the detectives could expect the tactical officers to knock and announce and not use a flash-bang without justification. The detectives were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

As to the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, the Eighth Circuit dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Board, as a municipal entity, could not claim qualified immunity, and the appellate court could not review the denial of summary judgment at that stage. The court did not decide the merits of the municipal-liability claim against the Board.

For officers executing warrants, this case is a strong warning that a flash-bang grenade is not just a routine entry tool. It is a significant use of force that must be tied to the actual risks known at the time. If the known dangerous suspect is already in custody, and officers have no specific reason to believe armed or violent people remain inside, the justification for a flash-bang becomes much weaker.

For SWAT and tactical supervisors, the case reinforces the need to gather and discuss facts before entry. Officers should be able to explain why the device was needed, what threat it addressed, what was known about occupants, and what steps were taken to reduce risk to innocent people. The Eighth Circuit did not say flash-bangs are always unconstitutional. It said their use must be justified by the particular risk present during that warrant service.

For knock-and-announce entries, officers should be careful about claiming the team was “compromised” merely because someone answered the door or because the occupants became aware police were present. In this case, the court viewed that reasoning as especially weak because the warrant required officers to knock and announce. When the law requires an announcement, the fact that occupants know police are there cannot automatically justify escalating to a flash-bang.

For detectives, the warrant-affidavit portion of the case is a reminder to include material facts, including facts that may cut against the theory of probable cause. The detectives ultimately prevailed because probable cause still existed after adding the omitted information, but the court did not approve of selective omission. A safer practice is to give the issuing judge the full picture, especially when location data, phone tracking, or suspect-address information is uncertain.

For detectives and supervisors deciding whether to request a tactical team, the case leaves an important caution. The detectives received qualified immunity, but the court acknowledged that authorizing a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in some circumstances, raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Requesting SWAT should be based on the facts known about the suspect, the location, weapons, criminal history, occupants, the evidence sought, and the risks of ordinary service.

For agencies, the municipal-liability issue was not resolved on the merits in this appeal. The Eighth Circuit did not decide whether the Board’s policies or customs were constitutional. Still, the case shows why departments should have clear training and guidance on when flash-bang grenades may be used and what precautions should be considered before deployment.