Clara Cheeks v. Mark Jakob

In Clara Cheeks v. Mark Jakob, 80 F.4th 872 (8th Cir. 2023), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a qualified-immunity appeal arising from a fatal police pursuit in St. Louis County, Missouri.

On August 10, 2018, at about 9:30 p.m., Mikel Neil was driving a Hyundai Elantra when St. Louis County police officers Alex Maloy and Mark Jakob pursued him for an alleged red-light violation. Neil crashed into a tree and died at the scene. Neil’s mother, Clara Cheeks, brought a civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide or summon medical aid after the crash.

The parties disputed how the crash happened. The officers said Neil simply lost control, left the roadway, and struck the tree. Cheeks argued that Officer Maloy, who was driving the police vehicle, performed a PIT maneuver, causing Neil’s car to spin out and crash. The court described a PIT maneuver as intentional contact by a police vehicle with a fleeing vehicle to force an end to a pursuit. Cheeks relied in part on an eyewitness who testified under oath that he saw the police vehicle bump Neil’s vehicle, causing the crash. The officers denied using a PIT maneuver.

The crash itself was not captured on video. Video showed moments shortly before the crash, but the actual impact occurred off screen. Cheeks also argued that video and witness testimony supported an inference that the officers either observed or should have observed the crash. The officers did not stop to render aid and did not call for medical assistance. An eyewitness called 911 within about 30 seconds. Neil died at the scene.

The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that factual disputes prevented a ruling in the officers’ favor. The officers appealed to the Eighth Circuit.

The issue before the court was whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage.

In plain English, the court had to decide whether, taking Cheeks’s version of the disputed facts as true, the Constitution required the officers to provide or call for medical aid after a crash that they allegedly caused during a pursuit. The court also had to decide whether that duty was clearly established enough that reasonable officers would have known they were violating the Constitution by failing to act.

The officers made two main arguments. First, they argued Neil was not in custody for Fourteenth Amendment purposes because he had not been physically arrested or apprehended after the crash. Second, they argued Cheeks could not prove a constitutional violation because there was no medical evidence showing that the officers’ failure to call for aid changed the outcome, especially because another person called 911 almost immediately.

Because this was an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, the Eighth Circuit could not simply reweigh disputed facts. It had to accept the district court’s view of the facts unless the record blatantly contradicted it. The court concluded the video did not blatantly contradict the eyewitness account because the crash itself was off screen.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The majority held that, if the officers intentionally used a PIT maneuver or similar vehicle contact that caused Neil’s car to spin out and crash into a tree, then a reasonable jury could find that the officers created a custodial situation requiring them to provide or summon medical aid.

The court began with the general rule from DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services: the Due Process Clause usually does not require the government to provide aid to private individuals. But an affirmative duty can arise when the state restrains a person’s liberty so that the person cannot care for himself. The court also relied on City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, which recognizes a governmental duty to provide medical care to persons injured while being apprehended by police.

The court reasoned that intentionally causing a fleeing vehicle to crash is different from merely pursuing a suspect who crashes on his own. In the court’s view, if officers intentionally performed a maneuver that caused Neil’s car to spin out and strike a tree, they restrained his freedom of movement and left him unable to care for himself. That was enough, at least on the plaintiff-friendly summary-judgment record, to create a Fourteenth Amendment duty to provide or summon medical aid.

The court also concluded the right was clearly established. It held that existing law gave officers fair warning that when they intentionally cause a crash during apprehension and the person is injured, they cannot simply leave without rendering aid or calling for medical assistance.

On the medical-evidence issue, the court rejected the officers’ argument that Cheeks needed proof that the lack of aid changed Neil’s outcome. The court distinguished between delay-in-treatment cases and no-treatment cases. In delay cases, a plaintiff often must provide verifying medical evidence showing that the delay caused harm. But Cheeks was not claiming the officers called too late; she claimed they never called and never provided aid at all. For a complete denial of medical aid, the Eighth Circuit held that she did not have to provide medical evidence proving that earlier aid would have saved Neil or changed the outcome.

The practical rule from the majority is narrow but important: when officers intentionally use force with a police vehicle to end a pursuit and that action allegedly causes a crash with serious injury, the officers may have a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment duty to provide or summon medical aid. A failure to do so can defeat qualified immunity, at least where a jury could find the officers knew about the crash and serious medical need.

Judge Stras dissented. He agreed that the officers may have had a duty under state tort law to try to help after causing the crash, but he did not believe existing constitutional law clearly established that Neil was in custody for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. In his view, a seizure by force is not necessarily the same as custody, and qualified immunity should have protected the officers because no prior case clearly answered that question.

For officers, the main lesson from Clara Cheeks v. Mark Jakob is that the medical-aid duty after a pursuit-related crash can become a constitutional issue, not just a policy or negligence issue, when police action allegedly causes the crash. The decision is especially relevant to PIT maneuvers or other intentional vehicle-contact tactics used to end a pursuit.

If an officer intentionally makes contact with a fleeing vehicle and the vehicle crashes, officers should treat the incident as creating an immediate need to check for injuries and summon medical assistance. The Eighth Circuit’s majority viewed that kind of police-caused crash as potentially placing the suspect in a position where he cannot care for himself. Under that view, leaving the scene or failing to call EMS can expose officers to personal civil-rights liability.

The case does not say that every pursuit crash automatically creates Fourteenth Amendment custody. The court’s reasoning depended heavily on the plaintiff’s allegation that the officers intentionally caused the crash through vehicle contact. The court specifically discussed the difference between a mere pursuit, an accidental crash, and an intentional police-imposed crash. If a suspect crashes without police contact, the constitutional analysis may be different, and that issue was not resolved here.

The case also does not decide that the officers are ultimately liable. It only affirmed denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment. A jury would still have to resolve disputed facts, including whether a PIT maneuver or other intentional contact occurred, whether the officers knew about the crash, and whether their conduct amounted to deliberate indifference.

For supervisors and trainers, this decision supports clear training on post-pursuit medical response. Pursuit and vehicle-intervention policies should not stop at when a PIT maneuver may be used. They should also address what officers must do immediately afterward, including stopping when safe, assessing occupants, requesting EMS, broadcasting the crash location, and documenting the aid response. The source opinion does not provide detailed policy language or officer-safety exceptions, so any agency-specific operational rule needs source verification against department policy, state law, and current training standards.

For officers writing reports, the case underscores the importance of accurately documenting what they saw, what they heard, whether contact occurred, when they became aware of a crash, what medical needs were apparent, and what steps they took to request or provide aid. In this case, the absence of video of the actual crash meant eyewitness testimony mattered. Clear contemporaneous documentation and available video can be critical in later litigation.

The bottom line is straightforward: in the Eighth Circuit, when police intentionally use vehicle force to end a pursuit and the suspect crashes, officers should not assume that a bystander’s 911 call satisfies their own legal duty. Promptly summon medical help and provide aid consistent with training, safety, and policy.