Brendlin v. California

In Brendlin v. California, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, the Supreme Court of the United States considered what a traffic stop means for a passenger, not just for the driver.

A sheriff’s deputy stopped a car in California after noticing that the vehicle’s registration appeared expired, although the car had a temporary operating permit displayed. Brendlin was riding as a passenger. During the stop, the deputy recognized Brendlin, learned or confirmed that he was wanted for a parole violation, and arrested him. A search connected to the arrest and stop led to evidence used in criminal charges against him.

Brendlin moved to suppress the evidence. His argument was that the original traffic stop was unlawful, so the evidence that followed should not be used against him. The California courts rejected his claim on the theory that, as a passenger, he had not been “seized” by the stop and therefore could not challenge it under the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether a passenger in a vehicle is seized when police make a traffic stop.

The issue in plain English was this: when an officer pulls over a car, is the passenger also stopped for Fourth Amendment purposes, or is only the driver seized?

That mattered because Fourth Amendment suppression rules generally require a person to show that his own rights were violated. If Brendlin was not seized during the stop, he could not challenge the legality of the stop. If he was seized, then he could argue that evidence found as a result of an unlawful stop should be suppressed.

The Supreme Court held that during a traffic stop, a passenger is seized just as the driver is seized. The Court explained that a reasonable passenger in a stopped vehicle would not feel free to simply leave the scene or ignore the officer’s authority. A traffic stop is a show of police authority directed at the vehicle as a whole, and everyone inside is subject to that restraint.

The practical rule from Brendlin v. California is that an ordinary traffic stop seizes all occupants of the vehicle, not only the driver. Because Brendlin was seized, he was entitled to challenge whether the stop itself was constitutional.

The Court did not decide in this ruling whether the original stop of the car was lawful. The case was about whether Brendlin, as a passenger, had standing to raise the Fourth Amendment issue. The answer was yes.

For officers, the main lesson is straightforward: when you stop a car, you are stopping the passengers too. A passenger may later challenge the legality of the stop and seek suppression of evidence that flows from it. Officers should not assume that only the driver can contest the basis for the stop.

This makes the reason for the traffic stop important for every occupant in the vehicle. If the stop is supported by reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or another lawful basis, Brendlin does not create a problem. But if the stop is unlawful, evidence found from a passenger may be vulnerable because that passenger was seized by the stop.

Brendlin does not prohibit officers from conducting traffic stops, ordering occupants to remain at the scene when lawful, or taking appropriate safety measures during a lawful stop. It also does not say that every police contact with a passenger in every setting is automatically a seizure. The rule is tied to the ordinary traffic stop, where a reasonable person in the passenger’s position would understand that the officer’s command to stop the vehicle also restricts the passenger’s freedom to leave.

In report writing and courtroom testimony, officers should be prepared to clearly explain the lawful basis for the stop at its beginning. The justification should not depend on what was discovered after the stop unless the law allows that sequence. Brendlin v. California means that the validity of the stop can matter not only for evidence against the driver, but also for evidence against anyone riding in the vehicle.